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Inter-Party Competition in Taiwan
since the 1990s
Despite the change in ruling party in 2000, most of the salient issues of
the 1990s remain on the political agenda
Dafydd Fell
1 In  stark  contrast  to  many  other  former  authoritarian  parties,  such  as  in  Eastern
Europe, Taiwan’s Kuomintang (KMT) initially adapted remarkably well to democratic
competition. Following the KMT’s resounding victory in Taiwan’s first full multi-party
elections in 1991, it was able to win majorities in a series of elections throughout the
1990s. After ruling Taiwan for over five decades, the KMT finally lost power following
its defeat by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) candidate Chen Shui-bian in the
2000 presidential election. Therefore this date marks the end of the KMT era and the
start of the DPP era. 
2 Was the turnover in ruling parties in 2000 a critical turning point for Taiwan’s inter
party competition? Or have party trends present in the 1990s continued into the new
millennium?  To  answer  these  questions  I  first  analyse  how  the  balance  of  power
between the major parties has shifted since 2000. Secondly, evidence from propaganda
content  analysis  is  examined to  see  if  the  policy  content  of  party  competition  has
changed. In other words the parties’ issue emphasis in the final decade of the KMT era
(1991-2000) is compared with the first two elections (2001 and 2004) of the subsequent
DPP era. 
3 2000 was a watershed year for the inter-party balance of power. Not only has the KMT’s
electoral hegemony come to an end, but also inter party competition has become far
more complex, as the number of significant political parties has increased. There have
been signs of both continuity and change in the policy content of party competition
over the last four years. Most of the salient issues of the 1990s remain on the political
agenda  in  the  DPP  era,  in  particular  Taiwan  independence,  Taiwan  nationalism,
democracy and political corruption. However a number of issues have faded from the
agenda,  such as  social  welfare,  while  other  issues  have risen in  salience,  especially
regarding the economy, government competence, and Taiwan nationalism. Although
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there  has  been  talk  of  polarisation  in  Taiwanese  politics  since  20001,  the  trend  of
convergence that began in the 1990s has continued into the DPP era.  While parties
appeared relatively distinct on many of the core electoral issues in the 1990s, party
lines have become blurred on a number of issues. 
The end of KMT hegemony
4 Since 2000 there have been three major island-wide national and local level elections.
These  were  the  2001  legislative  and  municipal  executive  elections,  and  the  2004
presidential  contest.  The results  for  these elections are displayed below in Table 1.
When these election results are compared to those of the 1990s it is clear that inter-
party competition has intensified. In addition to the two main parties, there are now
two parties on the right of Taiwan’s political spectrum, the New Party (NP) and People
First  Party  (PFP),  while  the  Taiwan  Solidarity  Union (TSU)  represents  the  first
significant new party on the left2. 
5 Since 2000 the KMT’s dominance of elections has come to an end. In terms of vote share
the KMT lost to the DPP in all three elections. Also for the first time the KMT lost its
majority in the Legislative Yuan, as the DPP became the largest party in that body.
When the KMT and PFP came together to create a joint presidential ticket in 2004 of
Lien Chan and Soong Chu-yu, they were still  defeated by the DPP’s Chen Shui-bian.
Although  the  assassination  attempt  on  Chen  Shui-bian  on  the  eve  of  the  2004
presidential election may have brought the DPP some sympathy votes, the shift in voter
behaviour patterns in favour of the DPP has been considerable. In almost every county
in Taiwan the DPP’s vote share increased by over 10%, and this was the first time the
DPP had garnered more than 50% of the vote in an island-wide election3. 
6 Equally worrying for the KMT has been the challenge of the two latest KMT splinter
parties, on the right the PFP, and on the left the TSU. With the charismatic Soong Chu-
yu at the helm, the PFP’s vote share and number of seats have been far higher than the
NP at its peak in the mid 1990s. This has meant that competition for pan blue votes is
especially  intense  in  multi-member  elections4.  Although  most  TSU  politicians  were
previously KMT members, the party has allied itself to the ruling DPP. With the former
president Lee Teng-hui serving as the TSU’s spiritual father, it has been able to attract
KMT voters and politicians dissatisfied with the current KMT leadership. In contrast,
despite the appearance of the TSU on the left  of Taiwanese politics,  the DPP’s vote
share and seats have continued to rise since 2000. 
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1. Election results since 2000
7 There  has  been  a  similar  trend  away  from  KMT  dominance  in  the  area  of  party
identification since the late 1990s. Table 2 shows the party support levels since 1998.
This reveals the shifting political balance of voters’ allegiances in Taiwan. Since 1998
the KMT’s support level has plummeted. In all four surveys since 2000 the DPP has been
the party with the highest support level. Moreover, apart from the 2003 survey, the
combined support level of the pan green parties has exceeded that of the pan blue
parties. In short, trends in party support levels also increasingly favour the ruling DPP. 
 
2. Party identification trends
8 How can we explain the pan blue parties declining popularity and electoral fortunes?
These  are  all  the  more  bewildering  when we consider  that  Taiwan experienced its
worst ever economic slump in 2001 and President Chen Shui-bian has had consistently
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low approval ratings. A May 2004 survey found 58% of respondents dissatisfied with the
DPP administration’s performance over the last four years5. 
9 A critical factor has been the parties’ contrasting electioneering skills. Although the
KMT remains by far the richest political party and has more extensive media resources,
the DPP has produced higher quality election communication and had more success at
media manipulation. In 2001 and 2004 the KMT attempted to focus the campaigns on
the DPP’s lack of government ability, the failing economy, and attacking Chen Shui-
bian. However, in both years the DPP was able to set the electoral agenda on more
favourable issues, such as anti corruption, the referendum, and Taiwanese identity. 
10 The pan blue parties have suffered from leadership problems. The KMT’s Lien Chan
lacks the charisma of his predecessor Lee Teng-hui,  and often appears wooden and
uncomfortable in election activities. However, it must be noted that he has shown great
survival ability, as despite repeated election disasters in 2000, 2001 and 2004, he has
retained his post as KMT chairman. The leader of  the PFP Soong Chu-yu is  a more
electorally savvy politician. He was a highly popular provincial governor in the 1990s
and  almost  won  the  2000  presidential  election  as  an  independent  candidate.
Nevertheless  he  has  struggled  to  find  a  political  role  since  leaving  the  provincial
government and has fallen in popularity. His declining fortunes were shown when he
agreed to serve as the pan blues vice presidential candidate in 2004, and in a recent poll
Soong had the lowest approval rate among Taiwan’s top ten politicians6. The KMT has
been unable to make full  use of  one of  its  most valuable assets.  Surveys show that
Taipei Mayor Ma Ying-cheou is Taiwan’s most popular politician7. If Ma had fronted the
KMT ticket in 2004 he would probably have come out victorious and reversed the KMT’s
long-term decline. Nevertheless his rise to power has been blocked by the reluctance of
Lien and Soong to leave the centre stage. 
11 A critical challenge for the three pan blue parties will be the proposal to merge into a
single party. This plan was raised by KMT chairman Lien Chan and is strongly backed
by most pan blue voters. Although the proposal would place the NP in a much stronger
position in future legislative and presidential  contests,  it  is  being blocked by high-
ranking politicians in both the PFP and KMT, who fear that a merger may damage their
own political careers. 
Comparing issue emphasis trends in the KMT and DPP eras
12 In order to examine the changing policy content of party competition in the two eras
mentioned  I  have  carried  out  a  content  analysis  of  parties’  newspaper  campaign
advertisements. The dataset covers all official party newspaper election advertisements
for 11 nationwide elections from 1991 to 20048. Advertisements were collected for the
31 days prior to voting day from the three newspapers with the highest readership: the
Zhongguo shibao (WWWW, China Times), Lianhe bao (WWW, United Daily News), and Ziyou
shibao (WWWW, Liberty  Times).  This  includes  583  official  party  ads  in  the  KMT era
(1991-2000)  and  224  official  ads  in  the  DPP  era  (2001-2004)9.  Campaign  ads  were
collected for Taiwan’s major parties: the KMT, NP and the DPP during the KMT era, and
for the KMT, DPP, NP, TSU and PFP in the DPP era. In the analysis all the text was coded
except campaign rally announcement and biographical details. This research project
follows a revised version of the Manifesto Research Group coding scheme10. 
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3. Top twelve issues in the KMT (1991-2000) and DPP (2001-2004) eras
Have the main electoral issues changed?
13 Table 3 shows the 12 most stressed issues in official party newspaper campaign ads in
the KMT and DPP eras. From the KMT era column it is apparent that if the party and
candidate categories are excluded, then the most salient issues during the 1990s were
political  corruption,  Taiwan  independence,  government  competence,  democracy,
women and peace. A glance at the DPP era column shows that there has been a great
deal of continuity in the electoral agenda, as the majority of KMT era issues remain in
the DPP era top 12.  Taiwan independence,  government ability,  political  corruption,
democracy and political  stability  all  remain highly  salient.  However,  there are  also
some  significant  changes.  Firstly,  Taiwan  nationalism  and  economic  growth  and
prosperity have appeared on the DPP era agenda, both coming in the top four. This
reflects an increasing consensus on stressing love for Taiwan among political groups,
but  also  the  increased  attention  economic  issues  have  received  following  Taiwan’s
declining economic performance since 2000.  Secondly,  the most salient issue in the
KMT era, political corruption, has fallen to ninth in the DPP era. Thirdly, while there
were more negative references to Taiwan independence during the KMT era, since 2000
this has been reversed, with more positive references to Taiwan independence than
negative references in election propaganda.
Have the individual parties top issues changed?
14 The next question examined is how have the major individual parties changed their
issue emphasis priorities since the change in ruling parties. To answer this question
Tables 4-6 show the top ten issues in the KMT and DPP eras for the KMT, DPP and NP
respectively.  From Table 4  we can see that  government competence,  and economic
growth and prosperity have been core issues for the KMT in both eras. However, there
is also considerable change. Firstly, since 2000 the party has given greater attention to
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economic issues. Secondly, the KMT has shifted its national identity position, as while
Taiwan independence has been dropped, the party has been at pains to stress its love
for Taiwan. Therefore, we see the appearance of Taiwan nationalism in the KMT’s top
ten since 2000. Also significant has been the KMT’s increasing appeals to professional
groups such as civil servants, teachers and the police. These groups were traditionally
the KMT’s “iron voters”, but with the strong competition for pan blue votes, the KMT
has had to emphasise itself as being best able to protect their interests. The final new
trend has been the appearance of multi-culturalism in the KMT’s post 2000 top ten,
reflecting its increasing appeals for ethnic reconciliation and accusations that the DPP
has incited ethnic antagonism. For instance, in 2004 the KMT proposed passing an “Anti
Ethnic Hatred Law”11.
 
4. Top ten issues for the KMT
15 Table 5 compares the top issues stressed by the DPP in the KMT and DPP eras. In both
eras the DPP has paid heavy attention to national identity issues, political corruption
and  democracy.  However,  in  the  area  of  national  identity,  the  party  has  clearly
moderated,  by  dropping  the  more  radical  pure  Taiwan  independence,  giving  less
emphasis  to  diluted  Taiwan  independence,  and  raising  the  salience  of  the  more
electorally acceptable Taiwanese identity12. Another interesting change is that now the
DPP is in power it has attempted to steal the KMT’s old issue of political stability, with
the issue coming eighth in the DPP’s top ten since 2000.
 
Inter-Party Competition in Taiwan since the 1990s
China Perspectives, 56 | november - december 2004
6
5. Top ten issues for the DPP
 
6. Top ten issues for the NP
16 From Table 6 we can see that the NP has the highest degree of continuity. In the DPP
era, the NP is even more focused on opposing Taiwan independence, and promoting
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Chinese nationalism and improved relations with the PRC. During the 1990s the NP’s
main  non-national  identity  appeal  was  clean  government,  however,  since  2000  the
political corruption issue has become relegated to only ninth in its top ten.
Do the parties still own the core electoral issues? 
 
7. Issue overlap on official newspaper advertisement issue top ten in the KMT era (1991-2000)
17 My previous research found that during the 1990s the three main parties in Taiwan
were  talking  past  each  other.  In  other  words  they  followed  a  pattern  of  stressing
different issues, concentrating on favoured issues and ignoring damaging issues13. This
is  apparent  in  Table  7,  which  shows  issue  overlap  on  official  party  newspaper
advertisement issue top tens for the main parties in the KMT era. Other than party:
positive and negative, the only issue category in all three parties’ top tens is political
corruption. However, the KMT’s level of emphasis on this issue was consistently lower
than both the DPP and NP in this era, and surveys show the public associates the KMT
with corruption, and the DPP and NP with clean governance14. In terms of issues, the
DPP and KMT have little in common; even the KMT and NP only share opposition to
Taiwan independence. In contrast, the lists of exclusively owned issues are far longer.
The  DPP  dominated  the  national  identity  issues  of  Taiwan  independence:  positive
Taiwan nationalism, along with freedom and human rights,  and democracy.  This  is
understandable as for many DPP politicians the key objectives of democratisation were
ethnic  justice  and  Taiwanese  self-determination.  Women’s  issues  and  welfare  state
expansion received greater DPP emphasis from the mid-1990s as the party sought new
issues to win elections. The KMT, on the other hand, controlled the main economic
issues,  political  stability,  law  and  order,  and  government  competence.  This  KMT
ownership of  government competence,  the economy,  and stability  is  not  surprising
considering that the KMT was the ruling party in Taiwan from 1945-2000. Moreover,
the  KMT  like  conservative  parties  worldwide  stressed  law  and  order,  placing
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considerable emphasis on criminal cases involving DPP members and DPP violence15.
Like  the  DPP,  the  NP  has  also  been  a  national  identity-orientated  party,  and  has
therefore dominated calls for better relations with mainland China, for more attention
to Chinese nationalism, and of warnings of the dangers of war with China. 
 
8. Issue overlap on official newspaper advertisement issue top ten in the DPP era (2001-2004)
18 The overlap on official newspaper advertisement issue top tens in the DPP era is shown
in  Table  8.  The  NP  appears  little  changed,  retaining  its  opposition  to  Taiwan
independence, calls for better relations with the mainland and promotion of Chinese
nationalism,  while  the  DPP  continues  to  stress  diluted  Taiwan  independence  and
women’s issues. However, there are also numerous signs of change. Firstly, the lists of
owned issues are much shorter for both the KMT and the DPP since 2000. While the
KMT owned six issues and the DPP five in the 1990s, since 2000 this has been reduced to
only  three  for  both  parties.  Secondly,  some  owned  issues  are  now  contested.  For
example, since the change in ruling party, the KMT has joined the DPP in stressing
Taiwanese identity. In short, Table 8 shows that since the change in government, the
distinction between party lines has become more blurred than during the 1990s.
Party change on single-issue spectrums
19 This  section examines  the  policy  content  of  party  competition in  greater  detail  by
tracking  emphasis  on  the  seven  core  political  issue  spectrums  that  featured
prominently in Taiwan’s elections before and after the change in ruling parties. I am
interested to see whether the parties have shown significant changes on single issues
since 2000, and if they are converging or becoming more polarised. 
Social welfare
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9. Social welfare issue emphasis
20 Social welfare is without doubt the least salient of the individual issues examined here.
Nevertheless, this article will track party movement on this issue because a previous
content analysis of legislator policy proposals found welfare state expansion the issue
for candidates of all parties that was most stressed between 1989 and 199816. 
21 Figure 9 shows that the welfare issue was dominated by the DPP in most elections
during the 1990s.  The KMT and NP tended to be far  more conservative on welfare
issues. While the NP condemned “free-spending social welfare”17, KMT candidates often
called  for  welfare  restraint,  cautioning  against  welfare  “free  lunches”18.  The  most
controversial welfare issue during this period was the DPP’s call for universal pensions;
this was a central DPP demand in the 1993, 1994 and 2000 campaigns19. This policy was
strongly opposed by most KMT and NP party leaders, who claimed this would bankrupt
the treasury and mocked the DPP for its failure to deliver its pensions pledges after
winning local elections20. The gap between the parties over this issue can be seen from
KMT legislator Apollo Chen’s comment in 2001, “Looking back over the last ten years, if
there is one issue that the DPP controlled, then it is the pensions issue”21. 
22 The post changeover period shows much change on the welfare issue, for while in the
KMT era the parties were polarised on the pensions issue, in the post-changeover DPP
era consensus has been reached. From Figure 9 we can see that in the elections of 2001
and 2004 all  the major parties have de-emphasised the welfare issue22.  In May 2002
cross-party support enabled legislation to be finally passed to fulfil the DPP’s promise
of universal pensions of NT$3,000 a month23. During the 1990s the KMT’s Lien Chan and
Soong Chu-yu had a  record of  strong opposition to  universal  pensions,  however,  it
appears that the KMT party headquarters has finally accepted this policy. As in the
2004 presidential campaign the KMT actually tried to outbid the DPP on pensions, with
a  pledge  of  NT$8,900  per  month  pensions24.  Though  the  parties  had  quite  distinct
positions and emphasis on social welfare during the 1990s KMT era, there has been a
de-emphasis and convergence on the DPP’s positions on issues such as pensions since
the change of ruling party. 
Political corruption
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10. Issue emphasis of political corruption
23 My content analysis of newspaper election ads in the 1990s has shown that political
corruption was the political issue most stressed during the KMT era25, challenging the
common claim that the most salient issue in Taiwanese politics is national identity26. 
24 Figure 10 plots the major parties’ stress on the corruption question between 1991 and
200427. This shows that political corruption was dominated by the DPP and to a lesser
extent the NP in almost every election in the KMT era. In contrast, the KMT appears to
have tried to avoid the issue. During the KMT era the KMT’s corrupt image stuck firmly
in the public consciousness28.  As a former KMT Propaganda Chief admitted, “It’s the
KMT’s greatest burden, and it can’t get rid of it”29. In contrast, opinion polls showed
both the NP and DPP had a reputation for promoting clean government30. During the
1990s the parties held quite distinct positions on political corruption. The DPP and NP
regularly called for radical anti-corruption reforms, to counter, e.g. vote-buying, KMT
party assets and contract corruption. In contrast, the KMT had narrower definitions on
what constitutes corruption.  Moreover,  since it  was reliant  on vote-buying and the
profits from its party businesses in election campaigns, it was highly reluctant to tackle
the issue. 
25 This trend of DPP issue ownership even continued in the first post-turnover election in
2001. The KMT only leapfrogged the DPP on political corruption in 2004, as it accused
the DPP presidential candidate Chen Shui-bian of a number of donation scandals and
his wife of stock market insider trading. For example, a full-page KMT ad showed the
photographs of  a  number of  financial  scandal  figures  with Chen Shui-bian and the
slogan, “Enough (stock market) speculation? Taiwanese are not idiots, Taiwanese can
also get angry!!”31 However, it is unclear whether the KMT will be able to steal this
issue, as in 2004 the DPP still made KMT black gold a slogan issue in a number of its ads,
for instance, the slogan, “Resolutely Oppose a Black Gold Restoration!”32 Moreover, the
KMT  originally  planned  to  make  political  corruption  the  theme  of  its  largest  pre-
election nationwide rally on March 13th 2004,  but after concern that such a theme
would  backfire  the  party  changed the  rally  theme to,  “Change  the  President,  Save
Taiwan”33. In terms of actual positions, there are clear limits on convergence. Although
the KMT has promised on a number of occasions to dismantle its business empire34,
little progress has been made, as it  is uncertain if  the party can survive electorally
without its assets. 
26 To sum up, the parties showed quite distinct patterns of emphasis on the corruption
issue until 2004, with anti-corruption dominated by the DPP. Although the KMT’s 2004
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campaign may have blurred party lines on corruption, the DPP still feels this is one of
their favourable issues. 
Taiwan independence versus Chinese unification
 
11. Issue emphasis of Taiwan independence versus Chinese unification
27 The Taiwan independence versus Chinese unification question is widely regarded as the
most divisive issue in Taiwanese politics and as one upon which Taiwan’s parties take
the most polarised positions35. The independence versus unification spectrum is often
referred  to  in  Taiwan  as  the  “TongDu”  (WW)  question,  at  the  centre  of  which  is
maintaining the status quo in cross-Strait relations. Public opinion has become more
moderate on this issue, as while only 28% preferred the status quo in 1990, this had
risen to 50.5% in 2002. Public opinion has been very cautious about embracing the more
radical solutions to the cross-Strait question, with a significant reduction in support for
unification from 51% in 1990 to only 15.1% in 2002, and only a limited rise in support
for Taiwan independence from 4% in 1990 to 19.7% in 200236. 
28 The Taiwan independence scores shown in Figure 11 are reached by subtracting the
proportion  of  issue  mentions  for  Taiwan  independence:  negative;  for  Taiwan
independence:  positive.  Therefore,  a  positive  score  represents  support  for  Taiwan
independence, while a negative score represents an anti-Taiwan independence stance.
Figure 3 shows Taiwan independence is completely dominated by the DPP, while the NP
and KMT share anti-Taiwan independence. Throughout the 1990s, there is not a single
case of the DPP and KMT leapfrogging each other on Taiwan independence. The only
time in the 1990s that the KMT had a positive score on this spectrum was in 1996 (4.4),
which was related to former president Lee Teng-hui’s  strong stand towards China’s
military threats.
29 Have the parties converged on the national identity question? It appears that the DPP
has definitely moderated its stance, as though it stressed pure Taiwan independence in
1991 and to a lesser extent in 1992, since the early 1990s the DPP has not openly called
for the declaration of a “Republic of Taiwan.” Even in the DPP candidate Peng Ming-
min’s 1996 presidential campaign, diluted Taiwan independence scored far higher than
pure Taiwan independence. The DPP has also downplayed the issue, while the KMT has
seen  the  issue  as  a  vote  winner,  even  in  local-level  executive  contests.  The  KMT’s
constant message was the terror equation “voting DPP = Taiwan independence = PRC
invasion = destruction”37. As would be expected, there is some overlap between the NP
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and the KMT and in the 2000 campaign the NP’s high score of -75 implies an increased
emphasis  on opposing Taiwan independence.  In  fact,  the KMT has  also  made some
movement towards the centre of the national identity spectrum particularly during Lee
Teng-hui’s  1996  presidential  bid  and it  appears  that  the  PRC’s  accusations  of  Lee’s
Taiwan independence intentions were not entirely without basis. Nevertheless, on core
ideological issues movement is constrained, the KMT could only move so far in the
Taiwan independence direction. For instance, the KMT’s 2000 presidential campaign
could not have been more different than four years earlier, with “Taiwan independence
negative” heavily stressed. In fact that year the KMT TV ad that had the most TV play
was the “Off to War Ad”. This showed a group of youngsters singing, “I’m off to war, I’m
off to war, because of A-bian’s one sentence advocating Taiwan independence, I’m off to
war”38. In fact following their parties’ defeat a number of KMT politicians blamed this
ad for its loss of voters to both the DPP and Soong Chu-yu39. 
30 Since the DPP came to power in 2000 the KMT’s predictions of cross-Strait war have not
yet materialised, therefore, the KMT is no longer able to use its terror equation. Figure
3 also shows a number of significant trends on the Taiwan independence issue since the
change in ruling parties. The arrival of the two new parties in the 2001 Legislative Yuan
elections has further complicated political competition on this debate. While the TSU
has staked a pro-independence position to the left of the DPP, Soong Chu-yu’s PFP has
kept a relatively ambiguous stance.  Both the NP in 2001 and the DPP in 2004 have
reaffirmed anti-independence and Taiwanese self-determination stances respectively.
In fact in 2001 the NP actually took its most extreme position to date when it proposed
a variation of the People’s Republic of China’s “One Country Two Systems”40. The KMT’s
position since Lien Chan became party Chair has shown some signs of taking a more
pro-unification  stance. For  instance,  Lien  has  proposed  unification  under  a
Confederation System41 and has called on the DPP administration to accept the “One
China Principle”. However, the Confederation System has faced stiff opposition within
his own party, and the proposal has not become official KMT policy. As KMT legislator
Chen  Hung-chi  stated,  “I  opposed  it.  It  will  make  people  think  we’re  more  pro-
unification”42. The KMT has had to adjust its policies in the light of moderate Taiwanese
public opinion.  As the KMT’s Chang Jung-kung commented in 2001,  “We know that
Taiwan’s public is afraid of unification”43. Therefore it is not surprising that Figure 11
shows in 2004 that the KMT ran its least anti-Taiwan independence campaign since
1996 and that the party stopped mentioning the “One China Principle” in the campaign.
31 In short, compared to the highly polarised state of parties on the “TongDu” issue in the
early 1990s, the parties moved towards a moderate centre in the mid- to late 1990s, and
this  convergent  process  has  continued  in  the  DPP  era.  However,  the  identity
components of parties’ ideology and issue preferences of their supporters have ensured
the parties remain moderately differentiated. 
Taiwanese nationalism
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12. Issue emphasis of Taiwan nationalism
32 The debates  over  Chinese  or  Taiwanese  identity,  Taiwanese  or  Chinese  nationalism
have been a regular feature of Taiwanese electoral campaigns since the late 1980s. This
is a field where Taiwanese public opinion has changed even more drastically than on
the “TongDu” spectrum. As late as 1989 52% of respondents identified themselves as
Chinese,  16% saw themselves as  Taiwanese and 26% identified as  both Chinese and
Taiwanese.  However,  by  2001  only  7.9%  identified  themselves  as  Chinese,  37.9%
identified as Taiwanese, and 50.7% saw themselves as both44. 
33 Figure 12 shows the main parties’ stress on Taiwanese or Chinese nationalism between
1991 and 2004. The Taiwan nationalism independence scores shown in Figure 12 were
reached by subtracting the proportion of issue mentions for Taiwan nationalism from
Chinese  nationalism.  Therefore,  a  positive  score  represents  support  for  Taiwan
nationalism,  while  a  negative  score  represents  a  Chinese  nationalist  stance.  In  the
1990s the DPP tended to use Taiwanese identity most in its propaganda, at times even
accusing the KMT of planning to betray Taiwan to the PRC45, while the NP was the most
likely to stress Chinese nationalist symbols such as Sun Yat-sen46. In contrast, the KMT
tried to take a middle route of dual identity that would not upset its diverse support
base.  An example of  this  message was in the 1994 newspaper ad slogan,  “We’re all
Taiwanese, even more we’re Chinese”47. However, in the late 1990s the KMT began to
make  more  Taiwanese  identity  appeals,  for  instance  a  2000  KMT  ad  carried  the
Taiwanese language slogan, “Who loves Taiwan more than I?”48. 
34 Since the change in ruling parties there have been claims that under Lien Chan the
KMT  has  returned  to  a  more  sinocentric  image49.  The  KMT  employed  Chinese
nationalist symbols such as Chiang Ching-kuo in its television advertisements in the
run-up to the 2001 legislative elections. The KMT appeared to have given up its Taiwan
identity appeals, as according to former KMT legislator Lin Yu-hsiang, “It’s impossible
for  us  to  attract  those  strong  localised  votes”50.  However,  Figure  4  shows  some
important trends regarding Taiwan nationalism in the DPP era. Firstly, the issue has
risen in salience since the 2000 presidential election, with the DPP and KMT, and both
new parties heavily stressing Taiwan identity in the DPP era elections. It appears that
there is now consensus among all major parties on stressing Taiwanese identity and
love for Taiwan. For instance, during the 2004 campaign the KMT and PFP made much
of their candidates’ kissing of the ground to express their true love of Taiwan51. In fact,
since the KMT’s defeat in 2004 there have even been proposals to change the official
title from the Chinese KMT to the Taiwan KMT52. Finally, Figure 12 shows that since
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coming  to  power  both  the  DPP  and  its  ally  the  TSU  have  actually  increased  their
emphasis of Taiwanese identity. This is an issue that the DPP sees as its greatest vote-
winner in the DPP era and thus it has attempted to keep it at the top of the electoral
agenda. The DPP’s February 28th 2004 Hand-in-Hand Rally was a key example of their
project of equating the DPP with love for Taiwan53.
35 Although since  the  mid-1990s  there  has  been  a  degree  of  convergence  on  identity
issues, with parties following public opinion by making Taiwan identity appeals, the
strength of Chinese and Taiwanese nationalism in the pan blue and green camps have
kept the parties apart on this issue. Even though the KMT is at pains to stress its love
for  Taiwan,  this  is  still  viewed  as  a  DPP-owned  issue.  In  fact  the  DPP’s  success  at
keeping Taiwanese identity at the centre of the 2004 electoral agenda was a critical
factor in its narrow victory. 
Government ability
36 Government competence is without doubt the clearest case of issue ownership in this
study.  Figure  13  shows  that  in  election  propaganda  the  issue  has  been  completely
dominated by the KMT in both the KMT and DPP eras, with no cases of leapfrogging.
Since the KMT fell from power it has reminded voters of its own excellent government
record, but also condemned the DPP administration as totally incompetent and lacking
in government achievements. For instance, a KMT 2004 ad asked, “Why did the DPP
legislator Chang Chun-hung openly criticise the Chen Shui-bian government as having
no achievements to show after four years in office?”54. In contrast, after four years in
power, neither the DPP nor its ally the TSU have made much attempt to challenge these
KMT attacks, preferring instead to move the agenda on to more favourable identity
issues. 
Political stability
37 Like government ability, Figure 14 shows that the KMT dominated the political stability
issue throughout the KMT era. A common KMT theme was that the DPP was a source of
instability, and stability could only be preserved by continued KMT administration. For
instance, a 1991 KMT newspaper ad described the election as a choice between stability
or disorder55. On the whole the DPP and NP tended to steer clear of the issue. However,
the  post  changeover  trends  shown  in  Figure  14  are  quite  different.  The  KMT  has
abandoned the issue since losing power, with the DPP and its ally the TSU giving the
issue much attention in the 2001 Legislative Yuan elections. In fact, in the DPP era, the
parties’ roles have been completely reversed, as now it is the DPP accusing the KMT of
creating instability. This image was reinforced by cases of electoral violence by KMT
supporters following defeat in 2000 and 2004 and the political tensions resulting from
the KMT campaign to impeach the DPP president in late 2000.
Economic issues
38 It is often assumed that economic issues have little impact on the voting behaviour of
Taiwanese, as Taiwanese have long been accustomed to high growth rates, low inflation
and almost no unemployment. However, the importance of economic issues is likely to
have risen since the economy began to slow in the mid-1990s56. 
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13. Issue emphasis of government ability
 
14. Issue emphasis of political stability
 
15. Emphasis of economic issues
39 Figure 15 shows that the KMT dominated economic issues in the 1990s, as it attempted
to take credit for high economic growth rates and warned that a DPP victory would
lead to a stock market crash and economic recession57. In contrast, neither the DPP nor
the NP showed much interest in economic matters during the 1990s. As a result, other
than in 2000 there were no cases of any parties leapfrogging the KMT on the economy
in either the KMT or DPP eras. 
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40 As in 2001 Taiwan went into recession experiencing negative growth of -2.2%58 and
record  unemployment  of  5.17%59.  In  both  2001  and  2004  the  KMT  made  the  DPP’s
failures of economic management core themes in its election campaigns. For instance,
in  2001  the  KMT  issued  a  number  of  article  style  ads,  which  compared  the  DPP’s
disastrous  economic  management  with the  KMT’s  successful  economic  record60 and
also  held  nationwide  pre-election  rallies  focusing  on  unemployment61.  Similarly,  in
2004 the KMT made promises of economic solutions, such as a 5% economic growth
rate, unemployment below 4%, and a balanced budget within six years62. 
41 In 2001 when the economy was at its lowest point, the KMT gave record attention to
economic issues, however the ploy did not pay off, with the DPP becoming the largest
political  party in the Legislative Yuan and the KMT suffering one of  its  worst  ever
defeats. In another sign that the KMT was less confident over the impact of economic
issues, we can see in Figure 7 that compared with 2001, the party reduced its stress on
the  economy  in  2004.  The  DPP  on  the  other  hand  appears  little  changed  from  its
opposition days, as it clearly prefers to shift the electoral agenda onto identity issues.
In fact in my 2001 interviews DPP politicians often pointed out that their economic
policies were little different from the KMT’s. The lack of economic policy differences is
apparent from the cross-party Economic Development Advisory Conference held in
August  2001,  in  which  the  parties  were  able  to  reach  a  consensus  on  almost  all
economic questions under discussion63. 
42 The KMT’s defeat in the 2000 presidential election has heralded a new era in Taiwan’s
party politics, as its electoral hegemony has clearly come to an end. Unlike in elections
in many other new democracies, Taiwanese elections have involved intense debate over
policy matters. The parties have offered voters quite distinct policy packages and issue
identities,  enabling  voters  to  choose  parties  that  match  their  issue  preferences.
Although there have been some changes in the policy content of party competition in
Taiwan, there are more signs of continuity over the last four years. The core electoral
issues of the 1990s remain firmly on the political agenda in the DPP era. The post-
election violence in the spring of 2004 has given the impression of party polarisation.
Nevertheless,  this  study  has  argued  that  the  trend  towards  policy  moderation  and
convergence that began in the mid-1990s has continued into the DPP era. However,
there  are  limits  to  convergence  as  differences  in  party  image  and  ideology  have
prevented the parties merging into indistinguishable catch-all parties. 
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RÉSUMÉS
This paper compares the state of party competition before and after the change of ruling party in
Taiwan in 2000. First the balance of power between Taiwan’s main political parties is discussed—
the KMT’s electoral hegemony has come to an end, the DPP has won two presidential elections
and become Taiwan’s largest parliamentary party. However, there is much continuity in Taiwan’s
party politics, with the same two parties electorally dominant today as at the outset of multi-
party elections in the late 1980s. 
The second part of the article analyses election propaganda to consider how the policy content of
party competition has changed and proposes that there have been more signs of continuity than
change in party issue emphasis over the last four years. 
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